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MILITARY HABEAS CORPUS: I*
Seymour W. Wurfelt
Preliminary Considerations
HE mobilization of over twelve million persons into the armed
forces in World War II made necessary a vastly expanded resort
to court martial proceedings to enforce the criminal law. The
trial by military tribunals of civilian employees of the military establishment in overseas areas and of prisoners of war and war crimes defendants added substantially to the number confined by military authority.
On January 31, 1950, there remained in federal penal institutions
25081 prisoners serving civilian type felony sentences imposed by military tribunals.2 Before World War II, legal problems arising from attempts to invoke the remedy of habeas corpus by military prisoners
were rare and were primarily of historical and academic interest. In
the past 6.ve years the quantitative pressure of this military prisoner
population has produced a substantial volume of case law in the 6.eld
of military habeas corpus, has caused the United States Supreme Court
to review the subject, and has made it one of practical interest to the
private practitioner as well as the military lawyer.
Accuracy requires expansion of the concise title "Military Habeas
Corpus" to "A Brief Study of the History of Military Tribunals and the
Scope of Habeas Corpus Review of Detention Imposed by Military
Authority." The material lends itself to the following organizations:
I. Historical Background; II. Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction; III. Habeas
Corpus Prerequisites; IV. Types of Military Detention Reviewable;
V. Ground for Habeas Corpus Relief; and VI. Conclusions.

T

I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. Early Military Law and Tribunals
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the long historical
separation of military and civil courts. Legal systems predicated upon
,,_ This article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the JD
degree at Emory University.
t Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Army; member,
California bar.-Ed.
1 From official records compiled by the Corrections Branch, Adjutant General's Office,
Department of the Army, from periodic wardens' reports.
2 Only those sentenced to serve terms of more than one year for felonies involving
moral turpitude are sent to federal penal institutions. All other military prisoners including
all those guilty of purely military offenses are confined in post guardhouses, rehabilitation
centers or United States Disciplinary Barracks. Amrr RllcuunoNs 600-375, ,i9.
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military organizations are of ancient origin. The feudal law was made
known to the Romans in the first century B.C. by the Teutons and was
utilized by the Roman Emperor, Alexander Severus. The Goths, Huns,
Franks, Vandals and Lombards upon the decline of the Roman Empire
borrowed from it the feudal law and carried it into Europe as an instrument of their military policy and it became the "law of nations" of
the western world of that time. The hard core of feudal law was predicated upon a military society in which a state of war was the normal
condition.3 By the eleventh century, feudal law had been codified in
Lombardy as the Libri Feudorum. 4 This well-developed continental
feudal system was brought to England by William ·the Conqueror in
l 066 and imposed on the simpler feudal system already existing in
Britain.5 It is of considerable academic interest that at least one creditable legal scholar maintains the primary purpose of the magnates and
the barons in 1215 in the Magna Carta was to preserve their feudal law
prerogatives against encroachment by the Crown rather than to establish a declaration of the rights of free men. 6 The Court Baron of the
feudal lord, which was also known as the earl's court, exercised both
criminal and civil feudal law jurisdiction over knights, tenants, and
vassals from before Magna Carta until well into the sixteenth century·
during the reign of Elizabeth.7
The Court of the Constable existed in medieval England apart from
and in addition to the common law, equity, canon and admiralty courts. 8
From the time of William, the Constable, under direction of the king,
was commander of the Royal Army. He presided over a court assisted
by the Marshal and three doctors of the civil law, and by a clerk who
was the trial judge advocate of that day since his duty was to prosecute
all delinquents brought before the court for trial. 9 The Constable's
Court exercised criminal jurisdiction over offenses of soldiers and others
against Articles of War promulgated by the king for the government
of his Army on expeditions to the continent. It also had jurisdiction
of the acts of rebels within the realm and in civil contract matters growing out of war beyond the realm. 10 As a Court of Chivalry it decided
3 2 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES, Cooley ed., 45-46 (1899).
4 RADIN, ANGLo-AMErucAN LEGAL H1sTORY 145 (1936).
5 Id. at 119, 152. Also, DAVIS, A TREATISB ON THB Mll.ITARY
8-rATBS, 3d ed., 13 (1915).
6RAf>m, A.NGLo-.AMEruCAN LEGAL HisTORY 152-155 (1936,.

LAw

T Id. at 139-140.
s FAIRMAN, THB LAw oF MARTIAL RuLB, 2d ed., 1-2 (1943).
9 DAVIS, A TRBAnsB ON THB MILITARY LAw oF THB UN1TBD
(1915).
10 FAIRMAN, THB LAw oF MARTIAL RULB, 2d ed., 3· (1943).

STATBS,

OF THB

UN1TBD

3d ed., 13-14
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questions of injury to honor, of pedigree, precedent, and heraldry.11
In 1384 Parliament imposed legislative restraint upon the civil jurisdiction of the Constable's Court:1 2 and in 1399 upon its criminal jurisdiction.13
Dating back to the Conquest, the Earl Marshal was the high officer
next in rank to the Constable. His original duties were those of marshaling the king's army and resembled those now performed by the
Adjutant General. The office of Constable ceased to exist in 152114
when it reverted to the Crown upon the attainder of the incumbent
Edward, Duke of Buckingham, for high treason. Thereafter the Constable's duties devolved upon the Earl Marshal, and the Constable's
Court became the Marshal's Court from which is derived the present
term court-martial.15 The last case tried before the Marshal was in
1737 but the function persisted, and as early as 1642 the House of
Lords and the Commons had concurred in legislation authorizing military commanders to punish soldiers by martial law.16 Gradually the
place of the Marshal and his assistants had been taken by military officers detailed for the purpose and the court came to be convened in pursuance of a commission issued by the Crown to a proper military commander.17 When armies were sent abroad authority was delegated to
the commander "to execute marshall law, and, upon trial by an orderly
court, ... to m 1ct pumshment. . .."1s
Originally the Articles of War were framed by the king and proclaimed solely by his authority. This procedure must be contrasted with
the later British practice, and that which has always prevailed in the
American service, whereby the Articles of War are exclusively statutory
enactments of the legislative body.19 The earliest English Articles of
War were promulgated in 1190 by Richard I as an ordinance. 20 Its

. a·

.

11 DAVIS, A TRBAnsn ON THB MILITARY LAw oF nm llNn'ED STATBs, 3d ed., 2, 14,
footnote 3 (1915). For a history of the Court of Chivalry, see THB ENGLISH MANuAL oF
Mn.n-ARY LAw 7.
12 8 Richard II, c. 5.
1s 1 Henry IV, c. 14.
14 This was the thirteenth year of the reign of Henry VIII.
15 DAVIs, A TRBATISB ON nm MILITARY LAw oF nm UNITBD STATBs, 3d ed., 13-14
(1915).
16 FAIRMAN, THB LAw oF MARTIAL RUI.B, 2d ed., 6, 12 (1943).
11 DAvis, A TRBATISB oN nm MILITARY LAw oF nm UNITBD STATBs, 3d ed., 15
(1915).
18 Commission to Sir Thomas Baskerville, June 10, 1597. CAMDBN SocmTY, THB
EmmToN PAPBRS 246, from FAIRMAN, THB LAw OF MARTIAL RuLB, 2d ed., 6 (1943).
19 FAmMAN, THE LAw oF MARTIAL RuLB, 2d ed., 6 (1943).
20 The entire ordinance as reprinted in 2 WINTHRoP, MILITARY LAw, appendix 3
(1886) reads:
"0nnINANCB OF llicHAl!D 1-A.D. 1190.
["ChieHy meant to prevent disputes between the soldiers and sailors, in their voyage
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terms impel the conclusion that it was efficacious in achieving its purpose "to prevent disputes between the soldiers and sailors." Richard's
approach to the problems of "unification" and a joint operation possess
the merits of vigor and simplicity.
Following this classic pronouncement of Richard I, successive Ar.tides of War were issued by royal :6.at or royal delegation as occasion
required. Only a few of these need be noted. In 1385 Richard II proclaimed Ar.tides of War comprising twenty-four paragraphed items governing not only the conduct of soldiers but providing in detail for the
division of the arms and mounts of those taken prisoner.21
Similar military codes establishing separate military tribunals are to
be found in other European countries at an early date. The :6.rst French
ordinance of military law dated back to 1378 and the :6.rst German
Kriegsartikel to 1487. Other celebrated Ar.tides of War were those of
the Franks under Emperor Charles Vin 1532, of the Netherlands in
1590, of Louis XIV in 1651 and 1665, of Peter the Great in 1715 and
of Empress Maria Theresa in 1768.22 Perhaps the most famous were
the elaborate Ar.tides of War issued in 1621 by King Gustavus Adolto the holy land." 2 Gnoss, His-r. llim. ARMY 83.]
''Richard, by the grace of God, King of England, Duke of Normandy and Aquitaine,
and Earl of Anjou, to all his subjects about to proceed by sea to Jerusalem, greeting. Know
ye, that we, with the common consent of fit and proper men, have made the enactments,
underwritten. Whoever shall slay a man on ship-board, he shall be bound to the dead man
and thrown into the sea. If he shall slay him on land he shall be bound to the dead man
and buried in the earth. If any one shall be convicted, by means of lawful witnesses, of
having drawn out a knife with which to strike another, or shall strike another so as to draw
blood, he shall lose his hand. If, also, he shall give a blow with his hand, without shedding blood, he shall be plunged in the sea three times. If any man shall utter disgraceful
language or abuse, or shall curse his companion, he shall pay him an ounce of silver for
every time he has so abused him. A robber who shall be convicted of theft shall have his
head cropped after the manner of a champion,* [*Champions hired to fight legal duels, in
cases of murder and homicides, had their hair clipped close to their heads. (Note by
Samuel)] and boiling pitch shall be poured thereon, and then the feathers of a cushion
shall be shaken out upon him, so that he may be known, and at the first land at which the
ship shall touch, he shall be set on shore. Witness myself, at Chinon."
21

Reprinted in 2 W.IN'I'HROP, Mu.rrARY I.Aw, appendix 4-7 (1886). The preamble

recites:

"These are the Statutes, Ordinances, and Customs, to be observed in the Army,
ordained and made by good consultation and deliberation of our Most Excellent Lord the
King Richard, John Duke of Lancaster, Seneschall of England, Thomas Earl of Essex and
Buckingham, Constable of England, and Thomas de Mowbray, Earl of Notingham,
Mareschall of England, and other Lords, Earls, Barons, Banneretts, and experienced
Knights, whom they have thought proper to call unto them; then being at Durham the
17th day of the Month of July, in the ninth Year of the Reign of our Lord the King
Richard II." Representative of its Articles is: "III. Item, that none be so hardy as to rob
and pillage the church, nor to destroy any man belonging to holy church, religious or
otherwise, nor any woman, nor to take them prisoners if not bearing arms; nor to force any
woman, upon pain of being hanged."
22 MUNSON, MILITARY I.Aw 5 (1923).
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phus of Sweden. These contained one hundred and sixty-seven articles,
a number of which, by their careful provision for court procedure, indicated concern for what currently would be characterized as "due process of law."23 Early British interest in the rudiments of military "due
process" was evidenced by some of the provisions in the Prince Rupert
Articles of 1672,24 in the English Military Discipline of James II of
1686,25 and in the Articles of James II of 1688.26
The English Parliament :first directly entered the :field of military
law with the passage of the Mutiny Act.27 It was initially adopted in
23 Reprinted

in 2 WINTHROP, Mn.rrARY LAw, appendix 8-23 (1886). illustrative are:
"142. In our highest Marshall Court, shall our General be President; in his absence
our Field Marshall; when our Generali is present his associates shall be our Field Marshall
first, next him our Generali of the Ordnance, Sergeant Major Generali; Generali of the
Horse, Quartermaster General; next to them shall sit our Muster-Masters and all our Colonells, and in their absence their Lieutenant Colonells, and these shall sit together when there
is any matter of great importance in controversie••••
"144. All these Judges both of higher and lower Courts, shall under the blue Skies
thus sweare before Almighty God, that they will inviolably keep this following oath unto
us: I.R.W. doe here promise before God upon his holy Gospell, that I both will and shall
judge uprightly in all things according to the Lawes of God, of our Nation, and these
Articles of Warre, so farre forth as it pleaseth Almighty God to give me understanding;
neither will I for favour nor for hatred, for good will, feare, ill will, anger, or any gift or
bribe whatsoever, judge wrongfully; but judge him free that ought to be free, and doom
him guilty, that I finde guilty; as the Lord of Heaven and Earth shall help my soule and
body at the last day, I shall hold this oath truly."
24 Reprinted in DAVIS, A TlU!ATISB ON THE Mn.rrARY LAw oP THE UNITED STATBS,
3d ed., appendix A, 567-580 (1915). The 74th and last Article thereof reads:
''Whatever is to be published, or generally made known, shall be done by beat of
drum or the sound of trumpet, that so no man may pretend ignorance thereof.
"And after that whoever shall be found disobedient, or faulty, against what is thus
published shall be punish'd according to these Articles, or the quality of the fact."
25 Reprinted in 2 WINTHROP, MrLITARY LAw, appendix 24-25 (1886). The following
is a typical excerpt:
"If the Counce! of War, or Court-martial be held to judge a Criminal, the President
and Captains having taken their places, and the prisoner being brought before them, And
the Informations read, the President Interrogates the Prisoner about all the Facts whereof
he is accused, and having heard his Defence, and the Proof made or alleged against him,
He is ordered to withdraw, being remitted to the care of the Marshal or Jaylor. Then every
one judges according to his Conscience, and the Ordnances of the Articles of War. The
Sentence is framed according to the Plurality of Votes, and the Criminal being brought in
again, The Sentence is Pronounced to him in the name of the Counce! of War, or CourtMartial.
''When a Criminal is Condemned to any Punishment, the Provost Martial causes the
sentence to be put in execution; And if it be a publick Punishment, the Regiment ought
to be drawn together to see it, that thereby the Soldiers may be deterred from offending.
Before a Soldier be punished for any infamous Crime, he is to be publickly Degraded from
his Arms, and his coat stript over his ears."
2 6 Reprinted in 2 WINTHROP, Mn.rrARY LAw, appendix 26-37 (1886), Article LXI
thereof provides:
''If any Person be committed by the Provost Martial's own Authority without other
Command, he shall acquaint the General or other Chief Commander with the Cause within
twenty-four hours, and the Provost-Martial shall thereupon dismiss him unless he have
Order to the contrary."
27 Statutes of the Realm 55, 1 W & M, c. 5, Reprinted in 2 WINTHROP, Ma.rrARY
LAw, appendix 38-39 (1886). Paragraph 10 directs:
"And noe Sentence of Death shall be given against any offender in such case by any
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the time of William III in 1689 as a result of the mutiny and desertion
of Scotch troops adhering to the Stuart cause in the rebellion of 1686.
Its purpose was to deprive the crown of any army for more than one
year at a time by limiting army appropriations and the authority to define and punish military offenses to one year. Thereafter, annual
mutiny acts were passed which made mutiny and desertion punishable
by court-martial, but left all other matters affecting discipline to regulation by royal prerogative as before, thus sanctioning the then existing
Articles for the government of the British Army. Not until 1881 were
the Mutiny Act and the Articles of War consolidated by Parliament
into the Army Annual Act. 28 Thus military law in time of peace did
not ~ome into existence in statutory form until the passage of the Mutiny Act. The system of governing troops in time of war by Articles of
War issued under the prerogative power of the Crown continued from
the conquest until superseded by corresponding statutory power2° in
1803.30 All earlier British ordinances and Articles of War remained in
force only during the service of the troops for whose government they
were issued and ceased to operate upon the conclusion of peace.31
Since 1881 Parliament each year passes the Army Annual Act which
includes the Articles of War and British military justice is dependent
upon this annual parliamentary approval. The various Articles of War and other military laws herein mentioned are illustrative only and do not by any means comprise a complete list. Although remaining substantially unchanged in matters
essential to discipline, new editions of Articles were issued from time
to time, especially during the last half of the eighteenth century. For
example from 1766 to 1775 seven sets of British Articles were issued.32
The foregoing summary clearly establishes that throughout British
history in time of war, from the Conquest to the American Revolution,
military laws and tribunals entirely separate from the civilian laws and
Court Martiall unless nine of thirteene Officers present shall concur therein. And if there
be a greater number of officers present, then the judgment shall passe by the concurrence
of the greater part of them soe swome, and not otherwise; and noe Proceedings, Tzyall or
Sentence of Death shall be had or given against any offender, but betweene the houres of
eight in the morning and one in the aftemoone."
•
28 GLENN AND SCHILLER, THB ARMY AND nm LAw, rev. ed., 34-35
WINTHROP, Mn.rr.ARY LAW AND PRBCBDENT, 2d ed., 19-20 (1920).
20 43 Geo. ID, c. 20
80 DAVIS, A TRBAnsB oN nm Mi:LI'l'.ARY LAw ol' nm UNITED STATBs,

(1943) and
3d ed., 339

(1915).
81 MUNSON, MILIT.ARY LAw 6 (1923).
8 2 DAVIS, A TRBAnsB ON nm MILIT.ARY LAW 01'

(1915).

nm

UNITBD STATBS,

3d ed., 340
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courts were employed to administer justice, in the armed forces. 38 It
is important to keep this in mind while examining the history of American military law and in considering the applicability of the writ of
habeas corpus to military tribunal proceedings.

B. American Military Latv and Tribunals
The substance of the original American Articles of War has been
traced to the Code of Gustavus Adolphus of 1621 and to the British
Articles of 1774.34 The first Articles of War drafted on American soil
for American troops were those adopted by the Provisional Congress
of Massachusetts Bay on April 5, 1775, for observance by Massachussetts troops. 35 They consisted of fifty-three articles and spoke of "...
the duty we owe ... to the king." These were followed by Articles enacted June 30, 1775, by the second Continental Congress36 consisting
33 Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. (61 U.S.) 65, 83 (1857).
34 DAVIS, A TREAnsB ON THI! Mn.!TARY LAw oF THI! liNITl!D

STATBs, 3d ed., 340-1
and 581-601, appendix B, at which the British Articles of 1774 are reprinted. Also
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENT, 2d ed., 19 (1920).
35 Reprinted in 2 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw, appendix 61-67 (1886). Its preamble
reads in part:
"Whereas the lust of power which of old oppressed, persecuted and exiled our pious
and virtuous ancestors from their fair possessions in Britain, now pursues with ten-fold
severity us, their guileless children, who are unjustly and wickedly charged with licentiousness, sedition, treason and rebellion; and being deeply impressed with a sense of the
almost incredible fatigues and hardships our venerable progenitors encountered, who fled
from oppression for tlie sake of civil and religious liberty for themselves and their offspring,
and began a settlement here on bare creation at their own expense; and having seriously
considered the duty we owe to God, to the memory of such invincible worthies, to the
King, to Great Britain, our country, ourselves, and posterity, do think it our indispensable
duty, by all lawful ways and means in our power, to recover, maintain, defend and preserve the free exercise of all those civil and religious rights and liberties, for which many
of our forefathers fought, bled, and died, and to hand them down entire for the free
enjoyment of the latest posterity••.•
"And whereas the great law of self-preservation may suddenly require our raising and
keeping an Army of observation and defense, in order to prevent or repel any further
attempt to force the late cruel and oppressive Acts of the British Parliament, which are
evidently designed to subject us and the whole Continent to the most ignominious slavery.
And whereas, in case of raising and keeping such an Army, it will be necessary that the
Officers and Soldiers in the same be fully acquainted with their duty, and that the Articles,
Rules and Regulations thereof be made as plain as possible; and having great confidence in
the honour and public virtue of the inhabitants of this Colony that they will readily obey
the officers chosen by themselves, and will cheerfully do their duty when known, without
any such servere Articles and Rules, (except in capital cases) and cruel punishments as are
usually practiced in Standing Armies, and will submit to all such Rules and Regulations as
are founded in Reason, honor and virtue. It is, therefore,
"Resolved, That the following Articles, Rules and Regulations for the Army, that may
be raised for the defense and security of our lives, liberties, and estates, be, and are hereby
earnestly recommended to be, strictly adhered to, by all Officers, Soldiers, and others concerned, as they regard their own honour and the publick good."
36 George Washington was a member of the legislative committee. WINTHROP, MILI-
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of sixty-nine articles. The preamble recited that "His Majesty's most
faithful subjects . . . are reduced to a dangerous . . . situation by . . .
the British minister . . . and oppressive acts of the British Parlia...
ment. . . ." Sixteen additional articles were enacted November 7,
1775.37
On September 20, 1776, American Articles of War consisting of
eighteen sections each containing from two to seventeen articles were
enacted by the Continental Congress. This revision was made at the
suggestion of General Washington.38 The work of revision was performed by a congressional committee composed of John Adams,
Thomas Jefferson, John Rutledge, James Wilson, and R. R. Livingston.39 This document was the first to speak of "... the respective
Armies of the United States" and omitted all reference to the Crown.40
In a period of eighteen months patriots of the Revolution had transformed the British military legal system into an American institution
considered to be appropriate for the government of an Army of freemen fighting for freedom. American courts-martial had already become
TARY LAw AND PrulCEDBNT, 2d ed., 21 (1920). These articles are reprinted in 2 WINMll.rrARY LAw, appendix 68-76 (1886). The preamble reads:
"Whereas His Majesty's most faithful subjects in these colonies are reduced to a
dangerous and critical situation by the attempts of the British minister to carry into execution by force of arms several unconstitutional and oppressive acts of the British parliament
for laying taxes in America, to enforce the collection of those taxes, and for altering and
changing the constitution and internal police of some of these colonies, in violation of the
natural and civil rights of the colonies;
_
"And whereas hostilities have been actually commenced in Massachusetts Bay by the
British troops under the command of General Gage, and the lives of a number of the
inhabitants of that colony destroyed; the town of Boston not only having been long occupied as a garrisoned town in an enemy's country, but the inhabitants thereof treated with
a severity and cruelty not to be justified even towards declared enemies;
"And whereas large reinforcements have been ordered, and are soon expected, for the
declared purpose of compelling these colonies to submit to the operation of the said acts;
which hath rendered it necessary, and an indispensable duty, for the express purpose of
securing and defending these colonies, and preserving them in safety against all attempts
to carry the said acts into execution, that an armed force be raised sufficient to defeat such
hostile designs, and preserve and defend the lives, liberties and immunities of the colonists;
for the due regulating and well ordering of which;
"Resolved, That the following Rules and Articles be attended to and observed by such
forces as are or may hereafter be raised for the purposes aforesaid."
THROP,

37Reprinted in WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw, appendix 76-78 (1886). DAVIS, A
TREATISE ON nm Mu.rrARY LAws OF THB UNITED STATES, 3d ed., 342 (1915).
ss DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THB Mll.rrARY LAws oF nm UNITBD STATES, 3d ed., 342
(1915).
39 WINTHROP, Mll.rrARY LAW AND PMCEDBNT, 2d ed., 22 (1920).
40 Art. 1, §XIV of these Articles, reprinted in WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw AND PMCBDBNT, 2d ed., 79-92 (1920), provides:
"A general court-martial in the United States shall not consist of less than thirteen
commissioned officers, and the president of such court-martial shall not be the commanderin-chief or commandant of the garrison where the offender shall be tried, nor be under the
degree of a field officer."
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recognized agencies of American justice. John Marshall, then a twentytwo year old captain-lieutenant of infantry, was, at Valley Forge in the
bitter fall of 1777, appointed "Deputy Judge Advocate in the Army of
the United States," in addition to his other duties.41 Thus John Marshall was a party to the shaping of American military law more than ten
years before there was a Supreme Court of the United States and more
than twenty years before he became Chief Justice of the United States.
Other pre-constitutional developments in the Articles of War are
worthy of note. By Congressional resolution of May 27, 1777, the general or commander-in-chief was given power to pardon or mitigate punjshments authorized by the Articles of War. 42 The most important of
other amendments made was that accomplished by congressional resolution on May 31, 1786, reducing the required membership of courtsmartial.43 It was the Articles of 1776 plus these amendments which
continued in force at and after the adoption of the Constitution.44 It
should be observed that from the very beginning American Articles of
War have been wholly statutory products of congressional exercise of
legislative power45 and that the jurisdiction of American courts-martial
has always been exclusively criminal.46
In approaching the constitutional treatment of military law and
tribunals it should be remembered that military men were active in the
Constitutional Convention and as constitutional advocates. General
Washington was unanimously elected to serve as president of the Constitutional Convention.47 It was largely due to the vast influence of
Washington48 and the active oratorical espousal of Federalist leader
John Marshall49 that the Virginia convention in June 1788 gave its
sorely-needed ratification to the Constitution.50 How then did this in41 I

BEVERIDGE, THB LIFB oF JoHN MARsHALL ll9, 138 (1916).
A TREATISE ON THB MruTARY LAws oF THB UNITED STATBs, 3d ed., 342

42 DAVIS,

(1915).

43 WINTHROP, Mn.lTARY I.Aw AND PRECEDENT, 2d ed., 23

(1920) says:
"The occasion of this Amendment, as expressed in the preamble of the Resolution of
Congress, was the fact that the pre-existing Articles failed to make adequate provision for
the trial of offenders 'serving with small detachments,' those articles requiring that a general court-martial should consist of thirteen members, and a regimental or garrison court of
five members; in the new section the number of the inferior court was fixed at three, and
the minimum of the general court at five-limitations which have subsisted to the present
time." The same minimum court membership is currently required by Articles of War 5
and 6 [62 Stat. L. 628, §§204, 205 (1948), IO U.S.C. §§1476, 1477].
44 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw AND PRECEDENT, 2d ed., 22 (1920).
45 Id. at 21.
46 Id. at 107.
47VAN DoRBN, THB GREAT RmmAnsAL 24 (1948).
48 Id. at 218.
40 Id. at 224.
r;o Id. at 230.
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fant instrument of government deal with the ancient yet virile institution of military law and its tribunals?
The Constitution vested in Congress power "To define and punish
... Offenses against the Law of Nations";51 "To declare.War ...
and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water" ;52 ''To
raise and support Armies ...";53 "To provide and maintain a Navy";54
"To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces";55 ''To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions";56
and "To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service
of the United States...."57 As to the President, the Constitution provided that he" ... shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of' the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual service of the United States";58 " • • • and shall
Commission all the Officers of the United States."59
The Third Amendment provided: "No soldier shall, in time of
peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner,
nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." Pursuant
to the Fifth Amendment, "No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger."
In Houston 11. Moore, Justice Washington who wrote the Supreme
Court opinion said:
"But military offenses are not included in the act of Congress
conferring jurisdiction upon the circuit and district courts; no
person has ever contended that such offenses are cognizable before the common law courts. The militia laws have, therefore,
provided, that the offence of disobedience to the president's call
upon the militia, shall be cognizable by a court-martial of the
United States; but an exclusive cognizance is not conferred upon
that court, as it had been upon the common law courts, as to other
51 Art. I, §8, cl. 10.
r;2 Art. I, §8, cl. 1I.
53 Art. I, §8, cl. 12.
54 Art. I, §8, cl. 13.
55 Art. I, §8, cl. 14.
56 Art. I, §8, cl. 15.
57 Art. I, §8, cl. 16.
58 Art. II, §2, cl. I.
59 Art. II, §3.
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offences, by the judiciary act. It follows, then, as I conceive, that
jurisdiction over this offence remains to be concurrently exercised
by the national and state courts-martial, since it is authorized by
the laws of the state, and not prohibited by those of the United
States."60

In 1857, in Dynes v. Hoover, the Court, after citing the pertinent constitutional provisions, held:
"These provisions show that Congress has the power to provide
for the trial and punishment of military and naval offences in the
manner then and now practiced by civilized nations; and that the
power to do so is given without any connection between it and the
3d article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the
United States; indeed, that the two powers are entirely independent of each other."61
It_ is significant that since the Bill of Rights no constitutional
amendment has dealt with a military subject. Apparently, the American people have continued satisfied with the views expressed in this
field by the founding fathers.
Under its power "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" Congress has perpetuated and from
time to time changed the Articles of War. The first United States
Congress by Act of September 29, 1789,62 recognized the existing military establishment and provided that the troops thus recognized should
"be governed by the rules and articles of war which have been established by the United States in Congress assembled, or by such rules and
articles of war, as may hereafter by law be established."
The Articles of War of 180663 consisting of 101 articles superseded
all other enactments on the subject and reverted to consecutive numbering without division into sections. These Articles, except for minor
amendments, remained in force until 1874,64 thus withstanding the
tests of the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War and part of
the Indian Wars. During the War of 1812 four articles were amended,
during the Seminole wars three were amended and one added and in
the Civil War seventeen articles were amended and eight added. 65
60 5 Wheat. (18 U.S.) 1 at 27 (1820).
6120 How. (61 U.S.) 65 at 79 (1857).
621 Stat. L. 95-96 (1789).
63 2 Stat L. 359 (1806). Reprinted in 2 WINTHROP, l\1rr.rrARY LAw, appendix, 98111 (1886).
64 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw AND PRI!CJIDENT, 2d ed., 23 (1920) and DAVIS, A
TREAnsB ON THB l\1rr.rrARY LAw oF THB UNITED STATBs, 3d ed., 343 (1915).
65 MUNsoN, MILITARY LAw 7 (1923).
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The Confederate States supplemented these Articles of 1806 by
a Congressional Act of October 9, 1862,66 establishing a separate court
of three civilian judges appointed by the president of the Confederacy
with jurisdiction over all offenses cognizable by courts-martial. These
tribunals were entirely separate from the civil courts. 67
The Articles of War of 187468 consisted of 128 Articles69 and were
essentially a restatement of the Articles of 1806.70 The Articles of War
of 191671 which became effective March 1, 1917, were the first complete revision of military law in one hundred and ten years and eliminated much obsolete material. These, in tum, were amended but not
completely revised by the Articles of 1920.72 The 1920 Articles consisting of 121 articles embraced certain changes considered desirable as
a result of World War I experience and are of importance since, with
minor amendments in 193773 and 1942,74 they are the Articles which
governed the Army throughout World War II. Accordingly these Articles of 1920 have been subjected to the scrutiny of the federal courts
in the habeas corpus litigation of recent years. It was the Army system
of justice prevailing under these Articles of 1920 of which the War
Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice715 spoke when it
said: "... that the innocent are almost never convicted and .the guilty
seldom acquitted." 76
Based upon World War II experience and the recommendations of
· the Advisory Committee, the Articles of 1920 were, without change in
total number, substantially amended in 1948,77 effective February 1,

see

66 Reprinted in 2 WINJ:HRoP, MILITARY LAw, appendix 318-320 (1886).
67 For an interesting account of courts-martial and militacy courts in the Confederacy
ROBINSON, JusncB IN GBEY 362-382 (1941).
. .
68 U.S. Rev. Stat. passed at the first session of the 43d Congress, 1873-74, 2d ed., Tit.

XIV, §1342, p. 230-242 (1878).

69 Reprinted in 2 WINJ:HROP, MILITARY LAw, appendix, 112-125 (1886).
10 MUNsoN, MILITARY LAw 7 (1923).
11 39 Stat. L. 619 at 650-670 (1916).
12 41 Stat. L. 787 (1920), 10 U.S.C. (1946) §§1471-1593a.
73 50 Stat. L. 724 (1937), 10 U.S.C. (1946) §§1522, 1542, amending arts.

70.

50¼ and

74 56 Stat. L. 732 (1942), 10 U.S.C. (1946) §1522, amending art. 50¼; 56 Stat. L.
1050 (1942), 10 U.S.C. (1946) §1586 (1942), amending art. 114; and 56 Stat. L. 1051
(1942), 10 U.S.C. (1946) §1524, amending art. 52.
75 The members of this Committee popularly known as the ''Vanderbilt Committee"
were, at the request of the Secretary of War, nominated by the American Bar Association
in 1946 to hold hearings and to formulate recommendations for the improvement of the
system of military justice. The chairman was Judge Arthur T. Vanderbilt of New Jersey
and its distingiushed membership included Judge Morris A. Soper of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Justice Alexander Holtsoff of Washington, D.C.,
.and Judge Frederick E. Crane of New York.
.
76 REPORT ol' ADVISORY CoMMITTBB ON Mn.ITARY JusnCB, p. 3.
77 62 Stat. L. 604 at 627-644 (1948), 10 U.S.C. (1950 Supp.) c. 36. ·
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1949. The only new provision of these 1948 articles which has yet
been construed by the federal courts is Article 53 which will be discussed in Part III.
Public Law 506 (81st Congress, 2d. session), approved May 5,
1950, established a "Uniform Code of Military Justice" for the Anny,
Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. Its 140 articles made
substantial revisions in both trial and appellate review procedure, especially so far as the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard are concerned.
This act is effective May 31, 1951.
Finally,,it is important to distinguish courts-martial from the administrative agency tribunals which have sprung up since Congress created the Inter~tate Commerce Commission. Almost without exception
the decisions of these late-corners in the £.eld of adjudication are subject to direct appellate review by the federal courts, either under their
individual_ basic acts or pursuant to section l O of the Administrative
Procedure Act. 78 Not so courts-martial, which under the Articles of
War79 have their own appellate procedure wholly apart from the Federal Courts. In the Administrative Procedure Act, Congress went to
great pains in section 2(a) to provide, "... there shall be excluded from
the operation of this Act ... (2) courts martial and military commissions...." This serves to underscore the basic legal proposition that the
federal courts have no appellate jurisdiction over courts-martial and
that the court-martial system is a separate jurisdiction wholly apart from
the civil federal judiciary.

C. The Writ of Habeas Corpus
'The writ of habeas corpus is of immemorial antiquity. It is
deduced by the standard writers on the English law from the
great charter of King John. It is unquestionable, however, that
it is substantially of much earlier date; and it may be referred
without improbability, to the period of the Roman invasion. Like
the trial by jury, it entered into the institutions of Rome before
the Christian era,. if not as early as the times of the republic.
Through the long series of political struggles which gave form to
the British constitution, it was claimed as the birthright of every
Englishman, and our ancestors brought it with them as such to this
country. At the common law, it issued whenever a citizen was de1s 60 Stat. L. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1950 Supp.) c. 19.
70 Articles of War 47, 48, 49, 50, 51 [IO U.S.C. (1950 Supp.) §§1518, 1519, 1520,
1521, 1523]. The immunity of courts martial proceedings from the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act is judicially recognized in Goldstein v. Johnson, (D.C. Cir. 1950)
184 F. (2d) 342.
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nied the exercise of his personal liberty, or was deprived of his
rightful control over any member of his household, his mfe, his
cliild, his ward, or his servant. It issued from the courts of the
sovereign, and in his name, at the instance of any one who invoked it, either for himself or another. It commanded, almost in
the words of the Roman edict,- 'De libero homine exhibendo' (D.
43, T. 29), - that the party under detention should be produced
before the court, there to await its decree. It left no discretion
with the party to whom it was addressed. He was not to constitute himself the judge of his own rights or of his own conduct;
but to bring in the body, and to declare the cause wherefore he had
detained it; and the judge was then to determine whether that
cause was sufficient in law or not. Such in America, as well as
England, was the well known, universally recognized writ of
habeas corpus." 80
Blackstone traced the ancestry of the writ of habeas corpus back
through Coke and Bracton to the ancient writ de odio at atia. 81 Radin
has established that it was this writ de odio et atia which Magna Carta
provided should "be denied to no man,"82 but also has shown that it
differed in material respects from the modern writ of habeas corpus.83
Habeas corpus in the form pertinent to this study is spoken of by
Blackstone in this language:
"... the great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement, is that of habeas corpus ad suhjiciendum; directed to the
person detaining another, and commanding him to produce the
body of the prisoner, with the day and cause of his caption and
detention, ad faciendum, suhjiciendum, et recipiendum, to do,
submit to, and receive whatsoever the judge or court awarding
such writ shall consider in that behalf.
80 This succinct statement of the historical aspect of the writ of habeas corpus was
made in 1855 by Judge John K. Kane of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania in United States v. Williamson, 28 F. Cas. No. 16,726, p. 686 at 688
(1855).
813 BLACKSTONE, CoMMI!NTARll!s, Cooley, 4th ed., 128-129 (1899):
''The writ de odio et atia was anciently used to be directed to the sheriff, commanding
him to inquire whether a prisoner charged with murder was committed upon just cause of
suspicion, or merely propter odium et atium, for hatred and ill-will; and if upon the inquisition due cause of suspicion did not appear, then there issued another writ for the sherifl:
to admit him to bail. This writ, according to Bracton, (i) ought not to be denied to any
man, it being expressly ordered to be made out gratis, without any denial, by magna carta,
c. 26, and statute West. 2, 13 Edw. 1, c. 29. But the statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 9,
restrained it in the case of killing by misadventure or self-defense, and the statute 28 Edw.
ID, c. 9, abolished it in all cases whatsoever: but as the statute 42 Edw. ID, c. 1, repealed
all statutes then in being, contrary to the great charter, Sir Edward Coke is of opinion •••
that the writ de odio et atia was thereby revived."
82 RADIN, ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 209 (1936).
83 Id. at 209-211 for a discussion of the writ de odio et atia.
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"... THIS IS A HIGH PREROGATIVE WRIT, and therefore by the common law issuing out of the court of king's bench
not only in term-time, but also during the vacation by a fiat from
the chief justice or any other of the judges, and running into all
parts of the king's dominions; for the king is at all times entitled
to have an account, why the liberty of any of his subjects is restrained wherever that restraint may be inB.icted."84
Judge-made law in the reign of Charles I held that a prisoner committed by special command of the king or by the lords of the privy
council could not be granted either release or bail upon habeas corpus
even though held without any cause assigned. The oppressive denial
by King's Bench of habeas corpus relief to Jenks, who was in 1676 committed by the king in council for a turbulent speech at Guildhall, resulted in the Habeas Corpus Act of 31 Charles II, c. 2. 85 Interestingly
enough this famous act excepted treason and felony and addressed itself
to granting bail rather than testing jurisdiction. Today it would no
doubt be considered a most inadequate remedy. The Habeas Corpus Act
did not change the nature of the common law proceeding or the practice
of the courts in granting the writ. 86 Bushell's case,87 decided before the
Habeas Corpus Act, firmly established that the Court of Common Pleas
in England, although it possessed no criminal jurisdiction, had the common law power to issue writs of habeas corpus.
The American colonists brought with them the writ of habeas corpus.88 The Articles of Confederation contained no provision concemjng habeas corpus and the only constitutional treatment of the subject
was in Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, which requires that "the Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended unless when in
cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it." Thus
3 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs, Cooley ed., 131 (1899).
at 134-136. In part this Act provided:
"That on complaint and request in writing by or on behalf of any person committed
and charged with any crime (unless committed for treason or felony expressed in the warrant ••.); the lord chancellor or any of the twelve judges, in vacation, upon viewing a copy
of the warrant, or affidavit that a copy is denied, shall . . . award a habeas corpus for such
prisoner, returnable immediately before himself or any other of the judges; and upon the
return made shall discharge the party, if bailable, upon giving security to appear and
answer to the accusation in the proper court of judicature. • . . 3. That the writ shall be
returned and the prisoner brought up, within a limited time according to the distance, not
exceeding in any case twenty days."
86 Simmons v. Georgia Iron & Coal Co., 117 Ga. 305, 43 S.E. 780 (1903). This
case contains an interesting statement of the history of the writ of habeas corpus.
8 7 Reported in Sir Thomas Jones 18, 84 Eng. Rep. 1123; stated in Wood's case, 3
Wils. 175, 95 Eng. Rep. 996 (1771); restated in Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch (8 U.S.)
.,.75 at .,.80-81 (1807).
88 Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 85 at 95 (1868).
84

85 Id.
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it may be said that the Constitution simply assumed the existence of the
remedy of habeas corpus.89 Chief Justice Marshall expressed the opinion in I 807, in Ex parte Bollman,90 that the exceptional power to
suspend the writ vested in Congress and not the President, and this
was reaffirmed by Chief Justice Taney on circuit in 1861 in & parte
Merryman. 91
The earliest pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court
on habeas corpus was made in 1795 in an original proceeding in which
the Court admitted to bail in the sum of $4000 a defendant charged
with treason in the federal district court' for Pennsylvania.92 In an
original proceeding in 1806 the Supreme Court again granted habeas
corpus, to a person committed in Alexandria, Virginia, upon failure
to post a peace bond in the sum of $4000, upon the ground that the
warrant did not state an offense. In spite of his own momentous decision in· Marbury 11. Madison, 93 -that the Supreme Court under the
Constitution did not have original jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandate, Chief Justice Marshall speaking for the Court granted the writ
of habeas corpus. 94 The following year in 1807 in & parte Bollman
and Swartwout, supra, Chief Justice Marshall, as spokesman for the
majority of a divided Court, again granted an original application for
habeas corpus. That this was an original application by these petition89 United States v. Williamson, 28 F. Cas. No. 16,726, p. 686 at 688 (1855) contains the following account of the deliberations of the Constitutional convention on this
matter: "When the federal convention was engaged in framing a constitution for the
United States, a proposition was submitted to it by one of the members, that 'the privileges and benefits of the writ of habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this government in the
most expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be suspended by the legislature except
upon the most urgent and pressing occasions.' See the Madison Papers (vol. 3, 1365). The
committee to whom this was referred for consideration, would seem to have regarded the
privilege in question as too definitely implied in the idea of free government to need any
formal assertion or confirmation; for they struck out that part of the proposed article in
which it was affirmed, and retained only so much as excluded the question of its suspension from the ordinary range of congressional legislation. The convention itself must have
concurred in their views; for in the constitution, as digested, and finally ratified, and as it
stands now, there is neither enactment nor recognition of the privilege of this writ,' except
as it is implied in the provision that it shall not be suspended. It stands then under the
constitution of the United States, as it was under the common· law of English America, an
indefeasible privilege, above the sphere of ordinary legislation.''
90 4 Cranch (8 U.S.) *75 at *101 (1807).
9117 F. Cas. No. 9487, p. 144 (1861).
92 United States v. Hamilton, 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 17 (1795).
93 1 Cranch (5 U.,S.) 137 (1803).
94 Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch (7 U.S.) 448 (1806). The Chief Justice said:
"There is some obscurity in the act of congress, and some doubts were entertained by the
court as to the construction of the constitution. The court, however, in favor of liberty,
was willing to grant the habeas corpus. But the case of United States v. Hamilton, 3 Dall.
17, is decisive. It was there determined, that this court could grant a habeas corpus; therefore, let the writ issue, returnable immediately, together with a certiorari, as prayed.''
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ers, who were co-conspirators with Aaron Burr,95 is made clear from
the statement in the dissenting opinion of Justice Johnson, that, "the
prisoners are in confinement under a commitment ordered by the
superior court of the District of Columbia, upon a charge of high treason. This motion has for its object their discharge or admission to bail,
under an order of this court...." 96 In granting the writ Marshall made
the singular pronouncement that, 'The decision that the individual
shall be imprisoned, must always precede the application for a writ
of habeas corpus, and this writ must always be for the purpose of revising that decision, and therefore, appellate in its nature."97 The holding was that all habeas corpus petitions are addressed to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court and hence properly lie. That the Court so
intended was highlighted by the powerful dissent of Associate Justice
William Johnson who said,"... the principle in Marbury v. Madison
applies as much to the issuing of a habeas corpus in a case of treason, as
to the issuing of a mandamus in a case not more remote from the original
jurisdiction of this court."98
Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, 4 Cranch (8 U.S.) 11 75 at "'118 (1807).
at 101.
97 Jd. at 100. At page 100 the Chief Justice said:
"If the act of Congress gives this court the power to award a writ of habeas corpus in
the present case, it remains to inquire whether that act be compatible with the constitution. In the mandamus case (Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 175), it was decided, that this
court would not exercise original jurisdiction, except so far as that jurisdiction was given
by the constitution. But so far as that case has distinguished between original and appellate
jurisdiction, that which the court is now asked to exercise is clearly appellate. It is the
revision of a decision of an inferior court, by which a citizen has been committed to jail.
''It has been demonstrated at the bar, that the question brought forward on a habeas
corpus, is always distinct from that which is involved in the cause itself. The question
whether the individual shall be imprisoned, is always distinct from the question whether
he shall be convicted or acquitted of the charge on which he is to be tried, and therefore,
these questions are separated, and may be decided in different courts. The decision that
the individual shall be imprisoned, must always precede the application for a writ of habeas
corpus, and this writ must always be for the purpose of revising that decision, and therefore,
appellate in its nature."
11
98 Id. at 11 105. In dissent Justice Johnson said, at 104-5:
''It appears to my mind, that the case of Hamilton bears upon the face of it evidence
of its being entitled to little consideration, and that the authority of it was annihilated by
the very able decision in Marbury 11. Madison. In this case, it was decided, that congress
could not vest in the supreme court any original powers beyond those to which this court is
restricted by the constitution. That an act of congress vesting in this court the power to
issue a writ of mandamus, in a case not within their original jurisdiction, and in which
they were not called upon to exercise an appellate jurisdiction, was unconstitutional, and
void. In the case of Hamilton, the court does not assign the reasons on which it founds its
decision, but it is fair to presume, that they adopted the idea which appears to have been
admitted by the district-attorney in his argument, to wit, that this court possessed a concurrent power with the district court in admitting to bail. Now, a concurrent power in such
a case must be an original power, and the principle in Marbury 11. Madison applies as much
to the issuing of a habeas corpus in a case of treason, as to the issuing of a mandamus in a
case not more remote from the original jurisdiction of this court. Having thus disembar00

DG Id.
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This interesting controversy of original versus appellate jurisdiction
simmered for sixty-one years until reviewed in 1868 in 'Ex parte
Y erger.99 In that case a private citizen held upon a charge of murder
for trial by a military commission applied to a federal circuit court for
habeas corpus relief and the writ being there dismissed petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari to grant the writ denied below. The contention was that the Congressional Act of March 27, 1868, passed
to divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in McCardle's Case100 had
deprived it of all habeas corpus jurisdiction. The Court in rejecting
the assertion said:
'We are obliged to hold, therefore, that in all cases where
a Circuit Court of the United States has, in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, caused a prisoner to be brought before it, and
. has, after inquiring into the cause of detention, remanded him to
the custody from which he was taken, this court, in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction, may, by the writ of habeas corpus,
aided by the writ of certiorari, revise the decision of the Circuit
Court, and if it be found unwarranted by law, relieve the prisoner
from the unlawful restraint to which he has been remanded."101
This pronouncement established what has ever since been the law
on this jurisdictional issue.
The amazing thing about the otherwise able opinion of Chief
Justice Solmon Portland Chase in Ex parte Yerger was its complete
misconstruction of Marshall's decision in Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout. Chase deemed the Court bound by Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout to limit its habeas corpus activities to its appellate jurisdiction only
and indicated that if the matter were one of first impression he would
favor extending the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
rassed the question from the effect of precedent, I proceed to consider the construction of
the two sections of the judiciary act above referred to.
"It is necessary to premise, that the case of treason is one in which this court possesses
neither original nor appellate jurisdiction. The 14th section of the judiciary act, so far as
it has relation to this case, is in these words: 'All the before-mentioned courts (of which this
is one) of the United States shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus,
and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the
exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.'
I do not think it material to the opinion I entertain, what construction is given to this sentence. If the power to issue the writs of scire facias and habeas corpzis be not restricted to
the cases within the original or appellate jurisdiction of this court, the case of Marbury v.
Madison rejects the clause as unavailing; and if it relate only to cases within their jurisdiction, it does not extend to the case which is now moved for."
99

8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 85 at 98 (1868).
506 (1868).
85 at 103 (1868).

100 7 Wall. (74 U.S.)
101 8 Wall. (75 U.S.)
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petitions for habeas corpus.102 The unanimous Court in the Yerger
case while purporting to follow the decision in Bollman and Swartwout
actually rejected it and adopted the minority views expressed by
Justice Johnson. In this curious situation the Court while professing
adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis was unwittingly pursuing
the doctrine of self correction. That Chief Justices Marshall and Chase,
of all people, should have been the contrivers of this double legal
legerdemain calls to mind that "to err is human."
Chief Justice Chase in Ex parte Yerger either ignored or overlooked
two cases which followed the original rule of the Hamilton case. The
first of these is Ex parte Kearney1° 3 in 1822 in which the Court through
Justice Joseph Story affirmed its jurisdiction to entertain original applications for habeas corpus, but disclaimed any appellate jurisdiction
at all in criminal cases and denied the writ.104 The other case is Ex
102 Id. at 97. Chief Justice Chase said:
"If the question were a new one, it would, perhaps, deserve inquiry whether Congress might not, under the power to make exceptions from this appellate jurisdiction, extend the original jurisdiction to other cases than those expressly enumerated in the Constitution; and especially, in view of the constitutional guaranty of the writ of habeas corpus,
to cases arising upon petition for that writ.
''But in the case of Marbury v. Madison, it was determined, upon full consideration,
that the power to issue writs of mandamus, given to this court by the 13th section of the
Judiciary Act, is, under the Constitution, as appellate jurisdiction, to be exercised only in
the revision of judicial decisions. And this judgment has ever since been accepted as fixing
the construction of this part of the Constitution.
"It was pronounced in 1803. In 1807 the same construction was given to the provision of the 14th section relating to the writ of habeas corpus, in the case of Bollman and
Swartwout.
"The power to issue the writ had been previously exercised in Hamilton's case (1795),
and in Burford's case (1806), in neither of which cases does the distinction between appellate and original jurisdiction appear to have been made.
"In the case of Bollman and Swartwout, however, the point was brought distinctly
before the court; the nature of the jurisdiction was carefully examined, and it was declared
• to be appellate. The question then determined has not since been drawn into controversy."
10a 7 Wheat. (20 U.S.) 37 (1822).
104Id. at "'41. " ••• Upon the argument of this motion, two questions have been made:
first, whether this court has authority to issue a habeas corpus, where a person is in jail,
under the warrant or order of any other court of the United States; secondly, if it have,
whether, upon the facts stated, a fit case is made out, to justify the exercise of such an
authority.
"As to the first question, it is unnecessary to say more, than that the point has already
passed in rem judicatam in this court. In the case of Bollman and Swartwout ( 4 Cranch
75), it was expressly decided, upon full argument, that this court possessed such an authority, and the question has ever since been considered at rest.
·
"The second point is of much more importance. It is to be considered, that this court
has no appellate jurisdiction confided to it in criminal cases, by the laws of the United
States. It cannot entertain a writ of error, to revise the judgment of the circuit court, in
any case where a party has been convicted of a public offence. And, undoubtedly, the
denial of this authority proceeded upon great principles of public policy and convenience.
If every party had a right to bring before this court every case, in which judgment had
passed against him, for a crime, or misdemeanor or felony, the course of justice might be
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parte W atkins,1°11 decided in 1830. Chief Justice Marshall in the
Watkins opinion again reviewed and affirmed the doctrine of Supreme
Court habeas corpus jurisdiction as contained in the Hamilton, Burford, and Bollman and Swartwout cases, distinguishing them only to the
extent of pointing out that in each the prisoner had not, yet been con:6.ned under the judgment of a court. In denying the writ in the!
Watkins case Marshall rested his decision on the ground that as the
statutes then stood the Supreme Court had no appellate power to revise circuit court decisions in criminal cases and could not usurp that
power by the instumentality of habeas corpus.106 The ratio decidendi
was that the Court might not do by indirection what it could not do
directly, not that it lacked original jurisdiction in habeas corpus.
In Ex parte Dorr,1°7 the Court held that it could not issue a habeas
corpus to bring up a prisoner in custody under a sentence of a state
court since this power was not given to it under section 14 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, but did not go into the question of appellate
as distinguished from original jurisdiction.108
The cases of Metzger,1° 9 Kaine,110 and Wells,1 11 cited in the Yerger
materially delayed and obstructed, and in some cases, totally frustrated. If, then, this court
cannot directly revise a judgment of the circuit court in a criminal case, what reason is
there to suppose, that it was intended to vest it with the authority to do it indirectly?"
101> 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) *193 (1830).
106 Id. at *207: "The cases are numerous, which decide, that the judgments of a
court of record, having general jurisdiction of the subject, although erroneous, are binding,
until reversed. It is universally understood, that the judgments of the courts of the United
States, although their jurisdiction be not shown in the pleadings, are yet binding on all
the world; and that this apparent want of jurisdiction can avail the party only on a writ of
error. This acknowledged principle seems to us, to settle the question now before the court.
The judgment of the circuit court, in a criminal case, is, of itself, evidence of its own
legality, and requires for its support, no inspection of the indictment on which it is
founded. The law trusts that court with the whole subject, and has not confided to this
court the power of revising decisions. We cannot usurp that power, by the instrumentality
of the writ of habeas corpus. The judgment informs us, that the commitment is legal, and
with that information, it is our duty to be satisfied."
1013 How. (44 U.S.) 103 (1845).
,.
108 Id. at 105: "Neither this nor any other court of the United States, or judge
thereof, can issue a habeas corpus to bring up a prisoner, who is in custody under a sentence or execution of a state court, for any other purpose than to be used as a witness.
And it is immaterial whether the imprisonment be under civil or criminal process. As the
law now stands, an individual, who may be indicted in a Circuit Court for treason against
the United States, is beyond the power of federal courts and judges, if he be in custody
under the authority of a state.
"Dorr is in confinement under the sentence of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island,
consequently this court has no power to issue a habeas corpus to bring him before it. His
presence here is not required as a witness, but to signify to the court whether he desires
a writ of error to bring before this tribunal the 1:ecord of his conviction."
100 5 How. (46 U.S.) 176 (1847).
110 14 How. (55 U.S.) 103 (1852).
lll 18 How. (59 U.S.) 307 (1855).
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case, serve only to emphasize the confusion of the Court as to the nature
of its habeas corpus jurisdiction: In Kaine, an eight judge Court split
three ways in extended and inconclusive opinions. Four judges, without squarely meeting the issue of jurisdiction, denied the writ of habeas
corpus on the merits.112 Justice Curtis concurred, but only upon the
ground that the Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application, and in so doing shed some new factual light on the Burford
case but challenged even the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in habeas corpus.113 Three judges dissented on the ground that
112 Jn re Kaine, 14 How. (55 U.S.) 103 at 116 (1852) four judges through Justice
Catron .said: "After Kaine had been committed by the Commissioner, the Circuit Court
was applied to, by petition, for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari, to bring up the prisoner and proceedings before that court. The writs were issued, and a very thorough examination had of the law and the facts. The court decided that the commitment was, in all
respects, legal and proper, concurred with the Commissioner's decision, and ordered the
prisoner to be remanded to the custody of the marshal, under the commitment of the
Commissioner••••
"After this careful consideration of the case, in open court, the Circuit Judge granted
a second writ of habeas corpiis, and thereby stayed the warrant for Kaine's extradition,
awarded by the Secretary of State, and which had been delivered to the British authorities;
and the matter was again brought before that judge, at chambers, but not deeming it
proper to act, he adjourned the proceeding, as presented to him, into this court; and of the
case thus presented, we are called on to take jurisdiction. Cognizance could only be taken
of the matter, on the assumption that original jurisdiction existed in the Circuit Judge to
act, but on which he did not act; and the case comes here as one of original jurisdiction,
which we are called on to exercise; and as the Constitution declares that this court shall
only have appellate powers, in cases like this, it follows that the transfer made by the
Circuit Judge is of no validity, and must be rejected. Foreseeing that we might thus hold,
the counsel for the prisoner, Kaine, also moved this court, on petition, with the papers and
proceedings presented to the Circuit Judge annexed thereto, for writs of habeas corpiis and
certiorari, to bring up the defendant, and the record &om the Circuit Court, to the end
of having the decision of the court examined here."
11s Id. at "'124:
''There are two cases which have been chiefly relied on at the bar. The first is
Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch, 448. As this case has many facts in common with the
case at bar, it is necessary carefully to examine it. Without detailing the preliminary
proceedings, it will be sufficient to say, that Burford was committed to the jail of the county
of Washington, in the District of Columbia, by a warrant of certain justices of the peace,
which was defective, because it did not state 'some good cause certain, supported by oath.'
That he was brought before the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, upon a writ
of habeas corpus, and, after a hearing, [was by that court remanded to jail, appears] •••
from the original record in this court. • • •
"This case is relied upon as a decision to show, that although this court cannot, as
was held in Metzger's case,. issue a writ of habeas corpiis to examine the validity of the
warrant of the Commissioner; yet, if the Circuit Court, has, by such a writ, examined its
validity, pronounced it valid, and therefore dismissed the writ, and ordered the prisoner
to be continued in the custody of the marshal, this court may, upon a writ of habeas corpiis,
examine that decision, and reverse it, if found erroneous.
"Before considering whether the decision in Burford's case, goes this length, I think
it consistent with the profoundest respect for the very eminent judges who sat in that case,
to say, that it does not appear that the question now made, was by them examined and
considered, or that they themselves would have deemed it foreclosed by that decision.
" ••• I cannot. doubt, therefore, that if at that time the further question had arisen
whether the court had also jurisdiction to examine a cause of commitment by a Commis-
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the petition should be granted on the merits and because the Court
had jurisdiction under the Hamilton case without regard to whether
the circuit court had passed upon a petition for habeas corpus.114
In Ex parte Wells, by a six to three decision, the Court assumed
true appellate jurisdiction in a habeas corpus proceeding. Wells had
been convicted of murder in the District of Columbia and sentenced
to be hanged. President Fillmore granted a pardon conditioned upon
Wells being imprisoned for life. Wells petitioned the Circuit Court
of the District of Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus which was denied, and appealed from this decision. After considering the validity
of the conditional pardon the Court affirmed the order of the court
below. The majority did not discuss the jurisdiction issue, but two
judges dissented on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction.115
sioner, after the Circuit Court had reviewed that cause, and pronounced it sufficient, the
court would have thought it necessary to consider that question also de novo, upon all its
grounds, and would not have treated Burford's case as a sufficient basis on which to rest
their decision."
114 Id. at "'146, Justice Nelson, with whom Chief Justice Taney and Justice Daniel
concurred, said: " ••• I cannot but think the denial of the power to grant to writ of habeas
corpus, in this case, is calculated to shake the authority of a long line of decisions in this
court, from Hamilton's case, decided in 1795, down to the present one. That case, as
understood and expounded in the case of Bollman and Swartwout, in 1807, which received
the most deliberate consideration of the court, and to which the doctrine in Hamilton's
case was applied, held that this great writ was within the cognizance of the court, under
the 14th section of the Judiciary Act, in all cases where the prisoner was restrained of his
liberty, 'under, or by color of the authority of the United States,' and no case has held the
contrary since that decision, with the exception of that of Metzger, decided in 1847, which,
I have already stated, stands alone, but which distinctly admits the power and jurisdiction
of the court in the case before us.•..
"Upon the whole, I am satisfied, that the prisoner is in confinement under the treaty
and act of Congress, without any lawful authority. I am of opinion, therefore, that the
writ of habeas corpus should issue in the case, to bring up the prisoner."
115 Ex parte Wells, 18 How. 307 at 330 (1855). In the dissenting opinion Justice
McLean at 330, said: " .•• the petitioner is imprisoned under a criminal sentence of the
circuit court, either as originally pronounced, or as modified by the order of the circuit
court made under the writ of habeas corpus. That original or modified criminal sentence
is the cause of his commitment. Though this court has no jurisdiction by writ of error to
revise such a sentence, and has deliberately decided, in ex parte Watkins, that a writ of
habeas corpus cannot be made a writ of error for such a purpose, yet by a writ of habeas
corpus we do revise such a sentence in this case.
''It seems to me that the refusal of a writ of error in criminal cases is not only idle,
but mischievous, if a writ of habeas corpus, which is certainly a very clumsy proceeding for
the purpose, may be resorted to, to bring the record of every criminal case, of whatever
kind, before this court.
"With deference for the opinions of my brethren, in my judgment, it goes very little
way towards avoiding the difficulty to hold that, before one under a criminal sentence of a
circuit court can thus attack his sentence collaterally, in a court which cannot review it by
any direct proceeding, he must fust apply to the circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus;
and if the writ, or his discharge under it, be refused, he may then bring into action the
appellate power of this court, and by a writ of habeas corpus out of this court stop the
execution of a sentence, which we have no power to reverse. Few guesti?ns come before
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From this review of the state of the authorities at the time the
Yerger case came before the Court it is apparent that Chief Justice
Chase rendered a great service by his opinion. Since he brought authority out of chaos in a field where certainty was imperative his treatment
of the earlier cases should be cheerfully condoned. Since the Yerger
case courts have been content to cite it as the basic authority on the
point.116 The rule proscribing original jurisdiction (except as to ambassadors, public ministers and consuls) was from 1946 to 1950 repeatedly reaffirmed in denying, to over two hundred persons convicted of
war crimes by American Military Government Courts in Germany,
motions for leave to £.le petitions for original writs of habeas corpus in
the Supreme Court.117 That the point still is not without difficulty is
demonstrated by the four to four division of the Court in these cases.
Justice Jackson having disqualified himself, half of the balance of the
court felt that the doctrine of lack of original jurisdiction should be reexamined.
Although the Supreme Court at an earlier date had addressed itself
to the subject of military habeas corpus in the case of military commission prisoners118 it was not until 1879 that the Court first had before it
this court which may affect the general course of justice more deeply than questions of
jurisdiction. This great remedial writ of habeas corpus, so efficacious and prompt in its
action, and so justly valued in our country, may become an instrument to unsettle the
nicely adjusted lines of jurisdiction, and produce conflict and disorder. If the true sphere
of its action, and the precise limits of the power to issue it, should become in any degree
confused or indistinct, serious consequences may follow-consequences not only affecting
the efficient administration of the criminal laws of the United States, but the harmonious
action of the divided sovereignties by which our country is governed. For these reasons,
though sensible of the bias, which, I suppose, every one has in favor of this process, I have
heretofore felt, and now feel, constrained to examine with care the question of our jurisdiction to issue it; and being of opinion that this court has not power to inquire into the
validity of the cause of commitment stated in this petition, I think it should be dismissed
for that reason."

Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 at 23 (1876).
v. United States, 332 U.S. 789, 68 S.Ct. 92 (1947); Brandt, et al.
v. United States, 333 U.S. 836, 68 S.Ct. 603 (1948) (In this group of cases only three
judges dissented); Everett v. Truman, 334 U.S. 824, 68 S.Ct. 1081 (1948); In re Krautwurst, et al., 334 U.S. 826, 68 S.Ct. 1328 (1948); In re Ehlen, Girke, et al., 334 U.S.
836, 68 S.Ct. 1431 (1948); In re Gronwald, et al., 334 U.S. 857, 68 S.Ct. 1522 (1948).
Full citations of all these petitions are collected in footnote 1 to the opinion in Johnson v.
Eisentrag~, 339 U.S. 763 at 768, 70 S.Ct. 936 (1950).
11s Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 (1866) and Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall.
(75 U.S.) 85 (1868). It is beyond the scope of this article to pursue the niceties of distinction between various types of military jurisdiction other than to set forth here the classic
definition given by Chief Justice Chase in his separate concurring opinion in Ex parte
Milligan at page 141:
"There are under the Constitution three kinds of military jurisdiction: one to be exercised both in peace and war; another to be exercised in time of foreign war without the
boundaries of the United States, or in time of rebellion and civil war within states or
districts occupied by rebels treated as belligerents; and a third to be exercised in time of
116 For example,
111 Milch, et al.
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a habeas corpus proceeding involving detention resulting from a courtmartial conviction.119 That these two ancient elements of Anglo-American law, a court-martial sentence and a habeas corpus petition each
in its own right antedating Magna Carta, should have continued in
their respective separate courses without meeting in Supreme Court
litigation until after ninety years of American constitutional government is indeed remarkable. It is indicative of the fundamental aqtonomy of the American courts-martial system.
At this point the reader may have in mind Martin v. Mott,1 20 and
Dynes v. Hoover,1 21 and be preparing to do battle against the proposition above stated. True, in earlier cases the Supreme Court had
passed upon other collateral attacks against courts-martial proceedings
but never by habeas corpus.
The earliest case with a military background to engage the attention of the Supreme Court was that of Wise v. Withers,1 22 in which
Marshall wrote the opinion in 1806. Wise, a federal justice of the
peace, sued Withers, the collector of military fines, in an action of
trespass vi et armis for entering Wise's house and removing his goods.
The Circuit Court of the District of Columbia sustained a demurrer
and upon writ of error the Supreme Court reversed the lower court.
The Chief Justice said:
"... the court must, in c~:mformity with- that"import, declare
that a justice of the peace, within the District of Columbia, is exempt from the performance of militia duty. It follows ... that a
court-martial has no jurisdiction over [him] as a militiaman; he
could never be legally enrolled; and it is a principle, that a decision
invasion or insurrection within the limits of the United States, or during rebellion within
the limits of states maintaining adhesion to the National Government, when the public
danger requires its exercise. The first of these may be called jurisdiction under Mll.ITARY
I.Aw, and is found in acts of Congress prescribing rules and articles of war, or otherwise
providing for the government of the national forces; the second may be distinguished as
MILITARY GOVERNMENT, superseding, as far as may be deemed expedient, the local law,
and exercised by the military commander under the direction of the President, with the
express or implied sanction of Congress; while the third may be denominated MARTIAL
I.Aw PnoPER, and is called into action by Congress, or temporarily, when the action of
Congress cannot be invited, and in the case of justifying or excusing peril, by the President,
in times of insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war, within districts or localities
where ordinary law no longer adequately secures public safety and private rights." The extension of the President's military government jurisdiction to tribunals established in the
United States occupation zone of Germany by the State Department, as distinguished from
Department of Army tribunals, was approved in Madsen v. Kinsella, (D.C. W.Va. 1950)
93 F. Supp. 319.
110 Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
120 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 19 (1827).
12120 How. (61 U.S.) 65 (1857).
122 3 Cranch (7 U.S.) 330 at 337 (1806).
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of such a tribunal, in a case clearly without its jurisdiction, cannot protect the officer who executes it. The court and the officer
are all trespassers."
The point of decision was that since the court-martial did not have
jurisdiction of the person its decision was a nullity.
In Houston 11. Moore,1 23 in 1820, the Court on writ of error to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed that court's judgment upholding the constitutionality of a sentence of a state court-martial punishing disobedience to the call of the President. The majority of the
Court held:
''The state court-martial had a concurrent jurisdiction with
the tribunal pointed out by the acts of congress, to try a militiaman who had disobeyed the call of the president, and to enforce
· the laws of congress against such delinquent; and that this authority will remain to be so exercised, until it shall please congress to
vest it exclusively elsewhere, or until the state of Pennsylvania
shall withdraw from their court-martial the authority to take such
jurisdiction."
In Martin 11. Mott, supra, Mott had been convicted and :6.ned by
a court-martial for failing to enter the service as a militiaman in the
War of 1812 after having been required so to do by the President of
the United States. The defendant Martin, deputy marshal, had levied
execution on goods of Mott to satisfy the court-martial :6.ne. Mott
brought a possessory action in the New York Supreme Court to recover these goods and was given judgment on the pleadings which was
affirmed by the New York Court of Errors. On writ of error the Supreme Court reversed the judgments and upheld the jurisdiction of the
court-martial to try militiamen lawfully called into the service of the
United States. It also sustained the unlimited constitutional power of
the President to call forth the militia to repel invasion by extending
this power to the threat of invasion. This attempted collateral attack
of the court-martial sentence was in replevin. It did not and could not
involve habeas corpus since Mott was not in custody.
In Ex parte V allandigham,1 24 in 1863 the Court held it did not
have jurisdiction to review by certiorari the proceedings of a military
commission. In Dynes 11. fl.oover, supra, a sailor convicted by a navy
court-martial of attempting to desert brought a civil action in the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia against the United States
123

124

5 Wheat. (18 U.S.) I at 31 (1820).
I Wall. (68 U.S.) 243 (1863).
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Marshal for damages for false imprisonment. The Supreme Court on
writ of error affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in favor of the
defendant.125
As already indicated the historical threads of courts-martial and
habeas corpus proceedings first met in Ex parte Reed, supra. The
petitioner, a navy paymaster's clerk, contested the jurisdiction of a naval
court-martial convened on board the United States ship "Essex" at
Rio de Janeiro to try, convict and sentence him for malfeasance. The
Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts
denied the writ and remanded the petitioner to naval custody. The
Supreme Court in denying Reed's petition for certiorari laid down the
narrow limits of habeas corpus inquiry into confinement adjudged by
courts-martial in this language:
"The court had jurisdiction over the persons and the case. It
is the organism provided by law and clothed with the duty of administering justice in this class of cases. Having had such jurisdiction, its proceedings cannot be collaterally impeached for any
mere error or irregularity, if there were such, committed within
the sphere of its authority. Its judgments, when approved as required, rest on the same basis, and are surrounded by the same
considerations which give conclusiveness to the judgments of
other legal tribunals, including as well the lowest as the highest,
under like circwnstances. The exercise of discretion, within
authorized limits, cannot be assigned for error and made the subject of review by an appellate court.
125 Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. (61 U.S.) 65 at 81-82 (1857). In speaking of courts
martial sentence the Court said:
" •.• When confirmed, it is altogether beyond the jurisdiction or inquuy of any civil
tribunal whatever, unless it shall be in a case in which the court had not jurisdiction over
the subject-matter or charge, or one in which having jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it
has failed to observe the rules prescribed by the statute for its exercise. • . •
"When we speak of proceedings in a cause, or for the organization of the court and
for trials, we do not mean mere irregularity in practice on the trial, or any mistaken rulings
in respect to evidence or law, but of a disregard of the essentials required by the statute
under which the court has been convened to try and to punish an offender for an imputed
violation of the law.•.•
"With the sentences of courts martial which have been convened regularly, and have
proceeded legally, and by which punishments are directed, not forbidden by law, or which
are according to the laws and customs of the sea, civil courts have nothing to do, nor are
they in any way alterable by them. If it were otherwise, the civil courts would virtually
administer the rules and articles of war, irrespective of those to whom that duty and obligation has been confided by the laws of the United States, from whose decisions no appeal
or jurisdiction of any kind has been given to the civil magistrate or civil courts. But we
repeat, if a court martial has no jurisdiction over the subjecHnatter of the charge it has
been convened to try, or shall inllict a punishment forbidden by the law, though its sentence shall be approved by the officers having a revisory power of it, civil courts may, on
an action by a party aggrieved by it, inquire into the want of the court's jurisdiction, and
give him redress."
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'We do not overlook the point that there must be jurisdiction
to give the judgment rendered, as well as to hear and determine
the cause. If a magistrate having authority to fine for assault and
battery should sentence the offender to be imprisoned in the penitentiary, or to suffer the punishment prescribed for homicide, his
judgment would be as much a nullity as if the preliminary jurisdiction to hear and determine had not existed. Every act of a
court beyond its jurisdiction is void, Cornett v. Williams, 20 Wall.
226; Windsorv. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274; 7 Wait's Actions and Defences, 181. Here there was no defect or jurisdiction as to any
thing that was done. Beyond this we need not look into the record.
Whatever was done, that the court could do under any circumstances, we must presume was properly done. If error was committed in the righful exercise of authority, we cannot correct it.
"A writ of habeas corpus cannot be made to perform the functions of a writ of error. To warrant the discharge of the petitioner,
the sentence under which he is held must be, not merely erroneous
and voidable, but absolutely void. Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38;
& parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193; & parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.
"The application of the petitioner is, therefore, denied."126
The above language made directly applicable to habeas corpus proceedings the limitations already imposed by the Court in Dynes v.
Hoover, supra, on collateral attacks against courts-martial sentences in
general.
Although a few inferior federal courts have wavered, the Supreme
Court has never departed in any particular from the original forthright
pronouncement in Ex parte Reed. As we shall see later in Part V, the
Court had occasion in March 1950127 to reaffirm with force and clarity
this doctrine. Thus history merges into current problems in the field
of military habeas corpus.

II
JURISDICTION

The next subject for consideration is what courts have habeas corpus jurisdiction to inquire into confinement imposed by military authority.
A. State Courts
In 1871 in Tarble's Case,1 28 the Court, through Justice Stephen J.
126 100 U.S. 13 at 23 (1879).
121 Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S.

103, 70 S.Ct. 495 (1950) rehearing denied 339 U.S.
939, 70 S.Ct. 672 (1950).
12813 Wall. (80 U.S.) 397 (1871).
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Field, established the rule that a state court has no jurisdiction to test
the validity of the confinement of a person pursuant to color of federal
military authority. Tarble had, while under eighteen years of age, enlisted in the Army representing his age as twenty-one. Shortly thereafter he deserted, was later apprehended, and confined under charges
of desertion awaiting trial by court-martial. A Wisconsin court commissioner on petition of T arble's father issued a writ of habeas corpus,
conducted a hearing, and ordered Tarble released. The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin affirmed this order and the Suprem~ Court on writ of
error reversed the state court.129 The Court simply applied to federal
military confinement the general rule previously announced in Ableman v. Booth.13° Chief Justice Chase alone dissented. The decision in
Tarhle' s case has never since been challenged in the Supreme Court and
is controlling today.

B. Federal Courts
That in proper cases and within proper limits the federal courts
have habeas corpus jurisdiction to examine detention imposed by military authority was definitely established at least as early as Ex parte
129ld. at 411:
". • • the State judge or State court should proceed no further when it appears,
from the application of the party, or the return made, that the prisoner is held by an
officer of the United States under what, in truth, purports to be the authority of the
United States; that is, an authority, the validity of which is to be determined by the
Constitution and laws of the United States. If a party thus held be illegally imprisoned
it is for the courts. or judicial officers of the United States, and those courts or officers alone.
to grant him release.
·
"This limitation upon the power of State tribunals and State Officers furnishes no just
ground to apprehend that the liberty of the citizen will thereby be endangered. The
United States are as much interested in protecting the citizen from illegal restraint under
their authority, as the several States are to protect him from the like restraint under their
authority, and are no more likely to tolerate any oppression. Their courts and judicial
officers are clothed with the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus in all cases, where a
party is illegally restrained of his liberty by an officer of the United States, whether such
illegality consist in the character of the process, the authority of the officer, or the invalidity
of the law under which he is held. And there is no just reason to believe that they will
exhibit any hesitation to exert their power, when it is properly invoked. Certainly there
can be no ground for supposing that their action will be less prompt and efficient in such
cases than would be that of State tribunals and State officers.
"It follows, from the views we have expressed, that the court commissioner of Dane
County was without jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus for the discharge of the
prisoner in this case, it appearing, upon the application presented to him for the writ, that
the prisoner was held by an officer of the United States, under claim and color of the
authority of the United States, as an enlisted soldier mustered into the military service of
the National government; and the same information was imparted to the commissioner by
the return of the officer. The commissioner was, both by the application for the writ and
the return to it, apprised that the prisoner was within the dominion and jurisdiction of
another government, and that no writ of habeas corpus issued by him could pass over the
line which divided the two sovereignties."
1ao 21 How. (62 U.S.) 506 (1858).
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Milligan, supra, was discussed at some length in Part I, and need not
be here elaborated. The question as to what federal court shall exercise this jurisdiction requires some inquiry. The statute131 alone is not
crystal clear and resort must be had to the case authority.
It may be safely said that the normal tribunal for an original habeas
corpus petition is the federal district court of the district in which the
military prisoner is con6.ned,1 32 that the courts of appeal decline such
original jurisdiction and that the Supreme Court denies that it has
such jurisdiction.133 Beyond these basic principles interesting problems
arise.
In Hirota, Dohihara, Kido, et al. v. MacArthur, the Court in a per
curiam, six to one, opinion denied prisoners sentenced by the International Military Tribunal sitting in Tokyo, Japan, leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus on the ground that no United States
-court had power to set aside a judgment of an international tribunal.134
Justice Murphy dissented; Justice Jackson disqualified himself; Justice Rutledge reserved decision, which he did not render prior to his
death; and six months later Justice Douglas 6.led a separate concurring
opinion.135 He expressed the view that the acts of an American general
Title 28, United States Code, §2241, in pertinent part provides:
"(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof,
the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a
circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the
restraint complained of is had.
"(b) The Supreme Court any justice thereof and any circuit judge may decline to
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application for
hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.
"(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless(!) he is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or
is committed for trial before some court thereof."
132 Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 68 S.Ct. 1443 (1948).
188 See authorities collected in footnote 117 supra.
184 338 U.S. 197, 69 S.Ct. 1238 (1949). The per curiam opinion at page 198, read:
''The petitioners, all residents and citizens of Japan, are being held in custody pursuant to
the judgments of a military tribunal in Japan. Two of the petitioners have been sentenced
to death, the others to terms of imprisonment. They filed motions in this Court for leave
to file petitions for habeas corpus. • • •
''We are satisfied that the tribunal sentencing these petitioners is not a tribunal of the
United States. The United States and other allied countries conquered and now occupy
and control Japan. General Douglas MacArthur has been selected and is acting as the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The military tribunal sentencing these petitioners has been set up by General MacArthur as the agent of the Allied Powers.
"Under the foregoing circumstances the courts of the United States have no power
or authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and sentences imposed
on these petitioners and for this reason the motions for leave to file petitions for writs of
habeas corpus are denied."
185 Justice Douglas said, in part at page 204: ''I assume that we have no authority to
review the judgment of an international tribunal. But, if as a result of unlawful action,
one of our Generals holds a prisoner in his custody, the writ of habeas corpus can effect
181
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wherever performed and regardless of their international character
should be subject to the scrutiny of United States courts since the superiors of all American generals are physically present and subject to
such jurisdiction and may be required to issue orders controlling the
conduct of their subordinates. His concurrence was based on the ground
that the control of enemy prisoners was a political question exclusively
within the foreign affairs powers of the President and hence not subject to judicial review. These views of Justice Douglas did not receive the concurrence of any other member of the Court.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia followed the
Hirota case as controlling in affirming an order of the district court
denying a petition for habeas corpus made on behalf of a German
citizen held in custody by American Army forces in Germany while
serving a sentence imposed by "Military Tribunal IV."186 Upon finding that this was an international tribunal it was held that the district
court had no jurisdiction.
a release from that custody. It is the historic function of the writ to examine into the
cause of restraint of liberty. We should not allow that inquiry to be thwarted merely
because the jailer acts not only for the United States but for other nations as well." At
page 207: " ••• To this court the Supreme Commander appointed from names submitted
by the respective nations eleven judges-one each from the United States, China, United
Kingdom, Russia, Australia, Canada, France, The Netherlands, New Zealand, India, and
the Philippines. So I think there can be no serious doubt that, although the arrangement
is in many respects amorphous and though the tribunal is dominated by American influence
it is nonetheless international in character. But it should be noted that the chain of command from the United States to the Supreme Commander is unbroken. It is he who has
custody of petitioners. It is through that chain of command that the writ of habeas corpus
can reach the Supreme Commander." At page 215: "The conclusion is therefore plain
that the Tokyo Tribunal acted as an instrument of military power of the Executive branch
of government. It responded to the will of the Supreme Commander as expressed in the
military order by which he constituted it. It took its law from its creator and did not act
as a free and independent tribunal to adjudge the rights of petitioner under international
law. As Justice Pal said, it did not therefore sit as a judicial tribunal. It was solely an
instrument of political power. Insofar as American participation is concerned, there is no
constitutional objection to that action. For the capture and control of those who were
responsible for the Pearl Harbor incident was a political question on which the President
as Commander-in-Chief, and as spokesman for the nation in foreign affairs, had the final
say."
136Flick v. Johnson, (D.C. Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 983 at 986: "Concededly, the
International Military Tribunal, established under the London Agreement, was a court of
international character. How, then, can it be said that Military Tribunal IV was not of
the same character, with its existence and jurisdiction rooted in the sovereignty of the Four
Powers, exercised jointly through the supreme governing authority of the Control Council?
We think, therefore, that the tribunals established under its authority were legitimate and
appropriate instruments of judicial power for the trial of war criminals. (See 39 Am. J.
Int'l. Law, 1945, at pg. 525.)
"Accordingly, we are led to the final conclusion that the tribunal which tried and
sentenced Flick was not a tribunal of the United States. Hence the District Court was
without power to review its judgment and sentence. Hirota case, supra."
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This same court of appeals, however, in Eisentrager 11. Forrestal131
elected to follow the Douglas dictum in Hirota that the federal district
courts for the District of Columbia have habeas corpus jurisdiction over
persons scattered over the world in foreign countries if held in American
military custody because the superiors in the chain of command of all
American generals are to be found within the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia and so may be required by that court to issue orders
releasing persons so held. Eisentrager and the other petitioners were
German nationals in United States Army custody in Germany, pursuant
to conviction in China by an exclusively United States Military Commission, for law of war violations committed in China. The court of appeals reversed the district court dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded for consideration on the merits. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.138 This necessitated a choice between the conflicting views of
Justices Douglas and Black, on the one hand, and on the other, those expressed by the majority of the Court in Ahrens v. Clark, supra, that only
the district court of the district in which petitioner is confined has habeas corpus jurisdiction. The former view not only partakes of the spirit of
the knight-errant on a white charger with a roving commission to go
about doing good, but entirely ignores the limited and wholly statutory
nature of federal district court jurisdiction. The latter view, as here
applied, is consistent with Downes v. Bidwell doctrine,1 39 that the Constitution does not, per se, follow the flag. Since constitutional benefits
do not flow to those in territory permanently acquired by the United
States, unless and until Congress formally incorporates such territory,
it is difficult to work out a legal right for an enemy alien in foreign,
albeit occupied, territory to invoke such constitutional benefits. Congress, assuredly, has taken no steps to incorporate Western Germany as
a territory of the United States.
The Court in its six to three Eisentrager decision140 reversed the
court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court that
131 (D.C. Cir. 1949) 174
138 Sub nominee Johnson

F. (2d) 961.
v. Eisentrager, 338 U.S. 877, 70 S.Ct. 158 (1949). Fairman, "Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag," 1 STANFORD L. Rl!v.
587 at 631-643 (1949), presents a detailed discussion of the problem involved in the
Eisentrager case.
139 182 U.S. 244, 21 S.Ct. 770 (1901). Also Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197,
23 S.Ct. 787 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 24 S.Ct. 808 (1904). Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 25 S.Ct. 514 (1905). Madsen v. Kinsella, (D.C.
W.Va. 1950) 93 F. Supp. 319, follows the Dorr case in denying relief to an American citizen.
140 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 70 S.Ct. 936 (1950). Followed in Nash v.
MacArthur (D.C. Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 606 at 608.
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it was without jurisdiction. Justices Black, Douglas and Burton dissented. The majority expressly reserved decision in event the petitioner were an American citizen since that state of facts was not before
the Court. Justice Jackson speaking for the Court did say, "Citizenship
as a head of jurisdiction and a ground of protection was old when Paul
invoked it in his appeal to Caesar." The decision differentiated not
only between citizens and aliens, but between aliens of friendly and
enemy countries, and further divided the latter into resident and nonresident enemy aliens. The door was left just barely ajar for all but
the nonresident enemy alien. The Court also adverted to the fact that
except for the English-speaking peoples the writ of habeas corpus is generally unknown and that no reciprocity could be expected, and concluded that such extraterritorial application of organic law would _be opposed to the practice of every modern government. It held that the
Constitution does not confer immunity from military trial and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the service of a government at
war with the United States, and that it was within the jurisdiction of a
military commission to try these prisoners.
Among the sturdy foundation timbers relied upon in the construction of the majority opinion were included Ahrens 11. Clark, supra;
Downes 11. Bidwell, supra; and the rule of United States 11. CurtisWright Corp.,1 41 that the President is exclusively responsible for the
conduct of foreign affairs.
The Eisentrager decision is not only sound in principle, but is of
great practical importance to the Department of National Defense in
the discharge of those portions of its combat and occupational missions
which fall within the jurisdiction of military commissions. The Court
aptly said, "The obvious importance of these holdings to both judicial
administration and military operations impelled us to grant certiorari."
It also, with commendable realism declared, "The writ, since it is held
to be a matter of right, would be equally available to enemies during
active hostilities as in the present twilight between war and peace. Such
trials would hamper the war effort and bri~g aid and comfort to the
enemy. "
C. Foreign Courts
The current foreign policy of the United States, including as it does
military alliances and military assistance agreements results in the continuing presence of American military forces within the sovereign territory of friendly foreign nations. The international law problems as to
141299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216 (1936).
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the exercise of criminal and civil jurisdiction over such visiting forces
present a broad and interesting field of inquiry beyond the scope of this
paper. The basic rule as to trial jurisdiction so far as American courts
are concerned, was established by Chief Justice Marshall in 1812, in the
leading case of Schooner Exchange 11 M'Faddon142 and has been followed at least by the American writers on international law.143 It is to
the effect that where a foreign army, or fleet, marches through, sails
over, or is stationed in the territory of another state, with whom the
foreign sovereign to whom they belong is in amity, its members are exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place and are subject to the military law of their own government.
A practical difficulty however may arise from the fact that the international law view of the guest sovereign on this point may be in conflict with the American view. The author was confronted with this
situation in New Guinea in 1948 in a case involving American graves
registration military personnel. The wartime agreement by which
Australia and the United States had expressly and reciprocally vested
jurisdiction over armed force members in the nation which they served
had expired. The volume containing the report of Schooner Exchange
11. M'Faddon, brought in by air from Manila, was submitted to the one
and only judge of the civil court for all of Papua and the portion of New
Guinea mandated to Australia. After a careful reading of the opinion,
this jurist in substance said, ''Very interesting, but not the British rule,
and of course not binding on this court." Practical action ultimately
resulted in the United States exercising jurisdiction in this case but
this disposition did not flow from any meeting of the minds of the representatives of the two sovereignties as to a controlling international rule
of jurisdiction. Express reciprocal legislation, or at least a definitive reciprocal agreement, is essential wherever forces are to be maintained in
foreign countries.
Philippine Republic independence on July 4, 1946 gave rise to the
6.rst occasions for a foreign court to be petitioned to exercise habeas
corpus inquiry over American courts-martial sentences. The Military
Bases Agreement:1 44 which became effective on March 14, 1947 con142 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 116 (1812).
143 1 HYDB, lNr:eRNATIONAL LAw CHIBFLY As INTBRPRBTBD AND APPLIED BY TBl1
UNITllD STATBs, 2d rev. ed., §247, 819-820 (1945); LAWRBNCB, PRINCIPLBS OF INr:eRNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed., §107, 246 (1915); 1 OPPBNHEIM, OOBRNATIONAL LAw, 5th ed.,
§445, 662-663 (1937); WooLSBY, lNr:eRNATIOAL LAw, 5th ed., §68 (1891); WILSON,
HANDBOOK OF lNr:eRNATIONAL LAw §50, 148-149 (1910); Panama v. Schwartzfiger, 21 AM.
J. INT. L. 182 (1927); McNAIR AND LAUTBRPACHT, AmmAL DmBST, Case No. 114

(1927-1928).
144 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philip-
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tained complicated jurisdictional provisions making the same individual
subject to the jurisdiction of the Philippine civil courts or American
courts-martial depending on the place and nature of the act.145 This
situation gave rise to three original· habeas corpus proceedings in the
Supreme Court of the Philippines. The first of these cases arose early
in 1947 after Philippine independence and before the effective date of
the Military Bases Agreement. It was then decided in Washington as a
policy matter that the representatives of the United States in the Philippines should not plead sovereign immunity and should submit to the
jurisdiction of the Philippine courts.
The Philippine Supreme Court, not at all embarrassed by any distinctions between original and appellate jurisdiction, proceeded to exerpines concerning Military Bases. This Agreement was executed on behalf of the United
States by American Ambassador Paul V. McNutt pursuant to Congressional authority vested
in the President of the United States to enter into an executive agreement, and on behalf
of the Philippine Republic by its President, Manuel Roxas, and was subsequently ratified
by the Philippine Senate. U.S. DBPT. op STATE TRBATIBS AND Ormm. lNrm!NATIONAL
Am:s SERIES 1775.

XIII in part provided:
"I. The Philippines consents that the United States shall have the right to exercise
jurisdiction over the following offenses:
(a) Any offense committed by any person within any base except where the offender
and the offended parties are both Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of
the United States on active duty) or the offense is against the security of the Philippines;
(b) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of
the United States in which the offended party is also a member of the armed forces of
the United States; and
(c) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of
the United States against the security of the United States.
"2. The Philippines shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over all other offenses
committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the United States.
"3. Whenever for special reasons the United States may desire not to exercise the
jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraphs 1 and 6 of this Article, the officer holding the
offender in custody shall so notify the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the city or province
in which the offense has been committed within ten days after his arrest, and in such a
case the Philippines shall exercise jurisdiction.
"4. Whenever for special reasons the Philippines may desire not to exercise the
jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraph 2 of this Article, the fiscal (prosecuting attorney)
of the city or province where the offense has been committed shall so notify the officer
holding the offender in custody within ten days after his arrest, and in such a case the
United States shall be free to exercise jurisdiction. If any offense falling under paragraph
2 of this Article is committed by any member of the armed forces of the United States
(a) While engaged in the actual performance of a specific military duty, or
(b) During a period of national emergency declared by either government and the
fiscal (prosecuting attorney) so finds from the evidence, he shall immediately notify the
officer holding the offender in custody that the United States is free to exercise jurisdiction.
In the event the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) finds that the offense was not committed in
the actual performance of a specific military duty, the offender's commanding officer shall
have the right to appeal from such finding to the Secretary of Justice within ten days from
the receipt of the decision of the fiscal and the decision of the Secretary of Justice shall
be final.''
145 Article
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cise original jurisdiction. The first of these cases146 was brought by two
American civilian employees of the United States Army, then being held
in confinement awaiting trial by court-martial for misappropriation of
United States Government property, claiming that as civilians they
could be prosecuted only in the civil courts of the Philippines. So far
as American law was concerned, these civilian employees of the Army
overseas were, under Article of War 2, subject to military law. The
Philippine Supreme Court by a ten to one decision-in an opinion written by Chief Justice Moran dismissed the writ, held that the petitioners
were persons subject to American military law, and expressly affirmed
the doctrine of Schooner Exchange 11. M'Faddon without any consideration of the effect of the provisions of the Military Bases Agreement.
The next petition147 involved a Filipino civilian employee of the
United States Army who had been convicted by court-martial of misappropriating United States property from the port area in the City of
Manila. His contention was that under the Military Bases Agreement
the United States had relinquished the exercise of all jurisdiction within the City of Manila. The Court, again speaking through its Chief
Justice, construed an ambiguous provision of the Military Bases Agreement relative to jurisdiction in the port area, and granted the writ on
the ground that the United States had no jurisdiction over offenses
committed within the territorial limits of the City of Manila.
In the last of these unusual cases1 48 a Filipino civilian employee of
the United States Army had been convicted by court-martial of misappropriating United States property from an American base not within the City of Manila. He contended that the provision of Article XIII
of the Military Bases Agreement vesting jurisdiction in the United
States under these circumstances was violative of the Constitution of
the Philippine Republic and hence void. This contention raised an
issue which was considered to be exclusively one for Philippine determination and the petition was resisted by an assistant attorney general of
the Philippine Republic. The Philippine Supreme Court, Justice Paras
writing the opinion, upheld the constitutionality of the Military Bases
Agreement, dismissed the petition, and again affirmed the principle of
Schooner &change 11. M'Faddon.
146 Tubb and Tedrow v. Griess, Supreme Court of the Philippines, General Register
No. L-1325, April 7, 1947.
147 Miquiabas v. Commanding General, Supreme Court of the Philippines, General
Register No. L-1988, Feb. 24, 1948.
148 Dizon v. Commanding General, Supreme Court of the Philippines, General Register No. L-2110, July 22, 1948.

528

MrcmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 49

It must be stressed that these three cases are most unusual and
might never have reached decision if the United States had elected to
raise the issue of sovereign immunity. The Manual149 then in effect
did not cover the situation, it presumably not previously having arisen.
The new Manual provides that habeas corpus process of a foreign court
will not be obeyed.150 This gives an answer to the judge advocate in the
field, but due to the delicate considerations of diplomatic policy which
will inevitably be involved it is believed that the answer can be neither
so simple nor so final. The new Manual provision clearly requires report to higher authority and contemplates a policy decision in each case.
Pending such decision the judge advocate on the ground must seek continuance of a proceeding which is normally characterized by its summary nature. It seems essential that reciprocal jurisdictional agreements
be simple, crystal clear, and cover expressly, not only trial but also
habeas corpus or similar process where such is known to the law of the
other sovereign.

D. World Court
Any discussion of habeas corpus in the sphere of the court of international justice necessarily involves academic speculation. However, it
is not beyond the realm of possibility that the rule of Hirota 11. MacArthur may someday lead to a treaty-created habeas corpus jurisdiction
of the World Court to inquire into the jurisdiction of international
military tribunals. On the other hand it may be urged that the resort
to force implicitly prerequisite to the convening of international military tribunals is antithetical to ultimate extension of the rule of law in
this particular to the international sphere. Military tribunals constituted
by a single sovereign would presumably not come within the sphere
of such a convention or multilateral treaty.
[To be concluded]
U.S Anny (1928, revised to 1942).
U.S. Anny (1949) p. 263, ,r186, provides: "A
court or judge of a foreign country has no authority to inquire into the legality of restraint
upon any person held by United States military authority. Any process in the nature of
a writ of habeas corpus issued by any foreign court or judge to any officer acting in his
official capacity as an officer of the United States will not be obeyed, but its issuance will
be reported to the commander of the United States force within whose command the person restrained is located and to The Judge Advocate General of the Anny. Except as
authorized by Headquarters, Department of the Anny, no officer of the Anny of the United
States will subject himself, in his command capacity, to the jurisdiction of any foreign
court for such purpose."
149 MANuAL FOR CotmTS-MARTIAL,
150MANUAL FOR CotmTs-MARTIAL,

